THOUGHTS ABOUT A MULTINATIONAL
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION: A
REACTION TO THE VON MEHREN
REPORT
ANDREAS

F. LOWENFELD*

I
INTRODUCTION:

CREATING A WISH LIST

I am much intrigued by Arthur von Mehren's paper setting out a call for a
Hague Judgments Convention.1 I think his proposal for a mixed convention,
with green, red, and yellow lights for jurisdiction (or black, white, and shades
of gray, if you prefer) is quite ingenious. I like making law-which is why I
enjoyed being a Reporter for the Foreign Relations Restatement and why I
envy Professor von Mehren his role as prospective drafter of the multilateral
judgments convention. For political or negotiating reasons, being a member of
the United States delegation, he carefully avoids saying what such a convention
should provide. I can well understand that he does not want his proposal to
place the item on the agenda of the Hague Conference shot down by someone
who does not like a particular provision that might be contained in such a
convention. Clearly, as an official U.S. spokesman, Professor von Mehren does
not want to negotiate the merits of a multilateral judgments convention before
agreement has been reached on the shape of the table.
No such constraints apply to me. I am not a spokesman for the United
States, nor a member of a delegation, and I cannot imagine that anyone other
than my own self would be embarrassed by what I say. Whether the initiative
led by Peter Pfund and Arthur von Mehren is worthwhile, however, will depend
a good deal on what is said or written at the table, once agreement is reached
on its shape. I propose, therefore, to set out here what I think a sound
convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments should contain.
My thoughts are the product in part of experience with recognition of judgments
in both directions-that is, U.S. judgments abroad and foreign judgments in the
United States-in part on experience with the U.N. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
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Convention),2 and in part on my review of the experience with recognition of
judgments in the United States and under the Brussels Convention.3
It is important to point out that negotiation between the United States and
other states in the Hague Conference is quite different from negotiation among
the European states-including the United Kingdom. If anyone doubts this,
witness the problems that have arisen in respect to the Hague Evidence
Convention,4 as well as in the earlier negotiations looking to a bilateral
judgments convention between the United States and the United Kingdom. 5
Litigation in the United States means jury trials, expansive discovery, contingent
fees; it means treble damages, punitive damages, and massive damage awards
labeled compensatory but elsewhere perceived as going too far-notably for
pain and suffering.6 But it also means access to the most open market of any
major country, careful attention to procedural fairness, and, I submit, a country
more hospitable to foreigners and "foreignness" than any country I know of.
All of this, I think, must be understood when we contemplate a convention
concerning recognition and enforcement of judgments.
I do not suggest that each of the provisions I propose is essential, or that
each of the provisions I oppose would be a deal-breaker. My theme is neither
a white list nor a black list, but a wish list. I think my wish list is reasonable,
and consistent with a position that favors an end to litigation and obedience to
judgments. I believe that with skillful negotiation, many, if not all, of the
elements on my wish list may be attainable. If that belief turns out to be wrong,
I doubt that the effort to achieve a judgments convention is justified.
II
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS

I would divide my wish list in two-roughly speaking substantive and
procedural aspects, although in the context of recognition of judgments, these
two categories are more overlapping than mutually exclusive. I begin with what
I call substantive issues.

2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New
York June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 7, 1959;
for the United States Dec. 29, 1970).
3. Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, OJ. 1978, L304/77, Cmnd. 7395 as amended, 33 EC OJ. C 189 (July 28, 1990)
[hereinafter EEC Convention].
4. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1970, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1972).
5. See Proposed Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States for the
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, Cmnd. 6771 (1977), reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977). Negotiations on this Convention were abandoned in the late 1970s.
6. Pain and suffering, or equivalent concepts, are known in many jurisdictions, for example,
Schmerzensgeld in Germany and dommages morales in France, but they rarely reach the dimensions
common in U.S. judgments.
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A. The Overriding Principle
If the procedures in the rendering court were fair-as should be subject of
at least a presumption among states willing to enter into a judgments convention-the judgment should be recognized and enforced. There is no room, in
my view, for the kind of judgment recently rendered by a lower court in New
York, refusing recognition to a libel judgment rendered by an English court, on
the ground that the English court did not honor the values embodied in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.7 Nor, in my submission,
is there any room for the kind of judgment rendered recently by a lower court
in Berlin, refusing recognition and enforcement to a product liability judgment
rendered by a Massachusetts court, on the ground that the jury in rendering its
verdict did not explain the causal relationship between the alleged defect of the
defendant's machine and the plaintiff's injury.8 Here incidentally, is a perfect

illustration of interaction between substance and procedure: no American
would expect a jury to give a reasoned explanation of its decision.' But a
demand for a reasoned decision would in effect exclude judgments based on
jury verdicts from international recognition.
B. Public Policy
I suppose it is generally accepted that the law of recognition of judgments-whether expressed in statute, treaty, judicial decision, or even a
Restatement-must leave some safety valve for violation of public policy or
ordre public. I think a convention among states with basically shared values
should contain a definition of public policy that is very narrowly drawn. I like
the statement made by Judge J. Joseph Smith for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in connection with the New York Arbitration
Convention:
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards [read foreign judgments] may be
denied on [the] basis [of public policy] only where enforcement would violate
the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice.'

Public policy should not, as the Second Circuit also wrote, become a major
loophole in the Convention's mechanism for enforcement. 1 Neither a
difference concerning jurisdiction of the rendering court nor a difference

7. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992). Following the
decision, the parties reached a settlement, and the decision was not appealed.
8. Landergericht Berlin, Judgment of June 13, 1989 (Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co.), 1989 Recht
der intemationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 988 (F.R.G.), translated and reproduced in ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 440 (1993). This case, too, was settled
prior to decision on appeal, and thus should be regarded as evidence of attitude, rather than as
authority.
9. In fact, in Solimene, the jury answered six special questions. See Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co.,
507 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1987).
10. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socidt6 Gdn6rale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),
508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
11. Id.
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concerning damages should be permitted to slip by under the cover of public
policy or ordre public.2
C. Double Cause of Action
We are used to the double criminality rule in international extradition
treaties, 13 although I have never found it persuasive. If a fugitive from country
A, credibly accused by country A's authorities of a serious crime under A's law,
is found in country B, I believe B should be required to return him or her to A,
provided, of course, that the normal safeguards in the extradition treaty are
complied with. I do not think it should matter whether the crime charged in A
is also a crime, or also a felony, in B.' 4
One can debate this position, although not here. I bring it up only to
suggest that the issue is much easier in the context of civil litigation. A claim
in a civil action, as Professor Austin Scott, a reporter to the first Restatement
of Judgments, taught us forty years ago, is merged into a judgment if the
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 5 The operative part of a
judgment (postponing questions of injunctions and orders for specific performance) simply states that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of X
dollars, marks, yen, or whatever. Except in those few instances that fit through
the narrow opening of a public policy defense, I do not believe that a court in
which recognition and enforcement are sought should compare the underlying
action in the first forum (F-i) with the law of the second forum (F-2). Thus, I
approve of the judgment of the New York court recognizing and enforcing a
Quebec judgment rendered for the plaintiff in an action for alienation of
affection and criminal conversation, although such actions had been abolished
in New York twenty years earlier as contrary to New York's public policy.'6
Similarly, I approve the judgment of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
enforcing the judgment of a Hawaiian court for a deficiency under a mortgage,
although under Manitoba law a mortgagee that has foreclosed on a mortgage
has no further rights against the mortgagor. 7 I would hope a modern
judgments convention would make this point clear and express.

12. Compare EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters art. 28.
13. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. III, 28 U.S.T. 227; Treaty of
Extradition between the United States and Canada, Dec. 3, 1971, art. 2, 27 U.S.T. 983.
14. I hasten to add I am not suggesting abandonment or exclusion of purely political crimes, such
as lesd majest6, seditious libel, and the like. I include exclusion of political offenses in the normal
safeguards referred to in the previous sentence.
15. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18
(1982).
16. Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D.2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958) (treating a foreign
country judgment for this purpose in the same way as a sister-state judgment). Compare Parker v.
Hoefer, 142 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 1957).
17. Honolulu Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Robinson, 64 D.L.R.4th 551 (Man. Q.B. 1989).
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D. Damages
1. No doubt, the level and form of the award of damages are the most
controversial substantive aspect of any discussion of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. I am prepared to accept a compromise solution that
breaks somewhat with the thrust of my presentation thus far. I would be
prepared to agree expressly that punitive damages (properly defined) be
excluded from international recognition and enforcement, provided it was
clearly stated that a judgment awarding both punitive and compensatory
damages could be upheld as to the compensatory elements. I am pleased to see
that the German Supreme Court has recently so held, in a suit on a judgment
rendered by a California court arising out of a claim of sexual molestation of a
minor."8 I am less clear about multiple damages-for instance treble damages
in U.S. antitrust cases, but I would be prepared to concede that the doubled or
trebled amount need not be awarded in the second forum-again provided the
compensatory element of the judgment is not deprived of its entitlement to
recognition and enforcement.
2. When Professor von Mehren negotiated with the British in the 1970's,
the United Kingdom had not yet adopted the Protection of Trading Interests
Act 1980,'9 and thus we had not heard about the infamous "claw-back clause."
That clause, you will recall, is designed to enable a defendant who has paid
treble damages pursuant to the judgment of a U.S. court to recover in a British
court the amount that exceeds the compensatory element of the judgment. So
far as I know, that clause has not yet been applied in an actual case; it has no
place among parties to a judgments convention. Even if the rest of the
Protection of Trading Interests Act remains in effect-a subject on which I have
previously expressed my views 2 -section 6 (and corresponding provisions in
the laws of Canada 21 and Australia 22) have to go.
3. I believe that a judgment that includes lawyers' fees-whether by virtue
of a contingent fee arrangement under American law or by virtue of an award
for costs under the law of England, Germany, and many other states-should
be enforced like any other judgment, in other words, with no examination of the
composition of the damages.' Several recent cases persuade me that the point

18. Decision of Bundesgerichtshof, IX Civ. Sen. June 4, 1992, 118 BGHZ 312. For a detailed
discussion of this case in English, see Joachim Zekoll. The Enforceability of American Money
Judgments Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 641 (1992).

19. United Kingdom Laws 1980, c. 11, 47 Halsbury's Stat. 454 (4th ed. 1988).
20. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction,and Reasonableness: A Reply to A. V. Lowe,
75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1981).
21. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29, § 9 (1985) (Can.).
22. Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, No. 3 of 1984, § 10 (Austl.).
23. A reader may be surprised that I bring this issue up at all. But it was one of the grounds of
resistance raised in the well-known U.S. case, Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453
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is worth specifying in a convention, although agreement should not be too
difficult to obtain.24
4.

When the negotiation of a bilateral judgments convention between the

United States and the United Kingdom was going badly in 1978 because of
resistance by the British insurance industry, an attempt to rescue the project
focused on proposed Article 8A, which would have read as follows:
Where the respondent establishes that the amount awarded by the court of origin is
greatly in excess of the amount, including costs, that would have been awarded on the
basis of the findings of law and fact established in the court of origin if the assessment
of that amount had been a matter for the court addressed, the court may, to the extent
then permitted by the law generally applicable in that court to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, recognize and enforce the judgment in a lesser
amount.25

The object of the proposal, evidently, was to bridge the gap between the norms
of damage awards in the United Kingdom and the perceived excesses of such

awards in the United States in personal injury and wrongful death cases. The
court asked to recognize and enforce a judgment-presumably British-would
be bound to accept the findings of liability on which the judgment was based.

It could not, for instance, reexamine the proportion of the injury attributed to
the plaintiff or the causal relation between the alleged defect of a product and
the injury to the plaintiff. But as to damages, it could apply F-2 standards to
cut down the amount that could be collected in F-2.

I do not recall who first came up with this proposal, which intrigued me
when I first heard of it. On reflection, however, I believe the idea should be
discarded permanently. Quite apart from the practical problems of having a
court-or perhaps a special master-in F-2 reviewing the trial record in F-1
(imagine what would happen if the language of F-2 were not English), the
notion that a review of the size of an award can be separated from revision au
fond in general is unsound in principle. R~vision au fond is contrary to the

whole rationale of recognition and enforcement of judgments. It may well be
that a number of countries will be afraid to sign a judgments convention with
the United States, though it seems improbable to me that many manufacturers,

transport companies, and insurance companies can take advantage of the
American market while insulating themselves from judgments of American
F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972), and it also came up in the recent
German case cited at note 18 supra, in which the Court of Appeals, having cut down the award for pain
and suffering and eliminated the award of punitive damages completely, added 25% for attorneys' fees
to as much of the award as it was prepared to confirm, which it called the recognizable portion of the
punitive damage award. The Supreme Court of the Federal Republic reversed the Court of Appeals
on this point as well as on the reduction of recovery for pain and suffering.
24. Thus, I disagree with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986), which applied a "narrower, evidentiary-based
public policy" to reduce the judgment of a German court in a suit for legal fees brought by a law firm
in Berlin. Id. at 843. Ackerman is different from the cases cited in the preceding note in that legal fees
were not ancillary to a damage judgment, but were the entire object of the first action and judgment.
25. As the proposal went back and forth between the U.S. and British delegations and advisers in
both states, several differences in the drafting crept in. The thrust of the proposal, however, remained
as quoted.

Page 289: Summer 1994]

TOWARD A JUDGMENTS CONVENT'N

courts. I want to make clear, also, that what I have said here is not to be
regarded as a defense of all aspects of the American legal system, including the
level of tort damages. I do not, however, accept the idea of a convention that
would give half faith and credit to judgments of courts in the United States, or
that would be effective for controversies between merchants but would be
inapplicable to judgments in tort.
5. One more point about damages is worth noting. In a number of countries-most notably Germany-damages in tort cases are regularly awarded in
the form of periodic rather than lump sum payments. There are advantages and
disadvantages to periodic payments, which we know in the United States
principally in connection with child and spousal support and workers' compensation. I do not believe, however, that the issue is one for the law of recognition
of judgments. I see no good reason why a judgment ordering periodic payments
should not be enforced to the same extent as a judgment for a single payment.
If some form of trust or escrow needs to be created to secure the judgment
creditor's rights, so be it. We should not, however, decline to enforce a
judgment on some unsound principle that it is not "final" just because it calls
for periodic payments.
III
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

Thus far I have addressed only what I have called the substantive aspects of a
judgments convention-although, as is evident, that term is far from precise. I
want now to turn to some procedural aspects of a judgments convention as they
appear on my wish list.
A. Jurisdiction: Black, White, and Gray
It is not necessary to go into detail on the basic principle that only
judgments rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the judgment debtor
under internationally accepted criteria are entitled to recognition. I have
expressed at the outset my agreement with Professor von Mehren's idea of the
gray list, though I might draft the proposal somewhat more favorably to
recognition, for instance by permitting states to make declarations that
judgments rendered on the following bases of jurisdiction will not be recognized,
the idea being that courts would not be precluded from recognizing judgments
founded on other bases of jurisdiction.26
One may discuss which bases of jurisdiction fit into the white as opposed to
the gray list and, indeed, whether the gray list needs to be spelled out at all or

26. Compare, e.g., the declarations provided for under Article 10 of the Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signatureNov. 15, 1965, art. 2, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, whereby states may announce that they
do not accept service by mail or service through judicial officers or other officials without going through
the Central Authority.
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is simply an implied repository of jurisdictional bases not otherwise accounted
for. For example, one might debate whether "doing business" in a state through
a branch or agency subjects a firm to general jurisdiction, as seems to be the
majority rule in the United States,27 or only to claims arising out of the
operations of the branch or agency, as is the rule under the Brussels Convention.' Another example may be jurisdiction over co-defendants, one of whom.
is domiciled in the forum state but the others are not, as is permitted under the
Brussels Convention,2 9 and (with leave of the Court) under English law,' but
probably not under U.S. law.31 The Brussels Convention, which contains both
a black list (Article 3) and a white list (Articles 2 and 5-17), places in neither
list the provision of English law permitting jurisdiction on the basis that a
contract is "by its terms or by implication governed by English law. '32 My
view is that each of these questions is a marginal one, within a broad international consensus on the proper bases for judicial jurisdiction.
I note that the Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforcement
of Judgments, organized by the Hague Conference to discuss the von Mehren
proposal, places "doing business" as a ground of general jurisdiction in the
category of "Grounds of Jurisdiction that might be excluded," that is, as a
candidate for the black list. 33 I would prefer to include "doing business" in the
category of grounds of jurisdiction that could be, but would not be required to
be, recognized, that is, on the gray list. I could imagine some kind of horse
trading in the development of a gray list. For instance, the U.S. delegation
might give up its insistence on "doing business" as a basis for general
jurisdiction, while the Europeans (and others) might accept personal service on
the defendant as a basis for general jurisdiction, as recently rejuvenated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the Burnham case.'
B.

Res Judicata and Jurisdiction

1. What is not so clear is who decides in a given case whether the
jurisdictional standard has been met and how often the question may be raised.
The Brussels Convention is clear that jurisdictional questions are to be raised

27. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS, § 3.02121[a] (2d ed. 1991);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47 (1971).

28. EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 3, art. 5(5).
29. Id. art. 6(1).
30. Rules of the Supreme Court [R.S.C.], Order 11, Rule 1(1)(c) (Eng.).
31. See Casad, supra note 27, at § 3.03[1]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 40
cmt. i (1971).
32. R.S.C., Order 11, Rule 1(1)(d)(iii). Professor Schlosser, in the official Report on the October
9, 1978 Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Brussels Convention, asserts that jurisdiction on this basis
is precluded with respect to persons domiciled in contracting states. 22 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 59)
71,
87 (Mar. 5, 1979).
33. Hague Conf. Doc. L.c.ON No 2 (93), at 1 10 (Jan. 4, 1993).
34. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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only once-in an F-1 court."5 The United Kingdom Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982,36 with respect to judgments not covered by the Brussels
Convention, permits the defendant to challenge the jurisdiction in F-i, and, if
he loses and does not participate further in the action, the defendant may
challenge the rendering court's jurisdiction again in F-2, that is, in the United
Kingdom.3 ' The United States has a middle position,- applicable, so far as one
can tell, equally to judgments coming under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and to judgments rendered in foreign countries. A defendant may raise a
jurisdictional challenge in F-i, or he may default in F-1 and raise the jurisdictional challenge in an enforcement proceeding in F-2, but he cannot do both.3"
In other words, in the United States, the results of a challenge to jurisdiction in
F-1 are binding; in the United Kingdom, they are not. Within the Brussels/Lugano regime, the issue does not really arise, because a court in F-2
generally has no authority at all to examine the jurisdiction of the F-1 court, and
in the limited instances when the F-2 court can question the jurisdiction of the
F-1 court, the court in which recognition or enforcement is sought is bound by
the findings of fact on which the F-1 court based its jurisdiction. 9
2. My starting point on this question is that a determination of jurisdiction
after challenge in F-1 ought to be entitled to recognition, like other parts of the
judgment of F-i, and I have made this point in writing in the past.' I confess,
however, that my colleague, Professor Silberman, has been hammering away at
me on this issue, and has to some extent created doubts in my mind, though I
am far from recantation. A possible compromise, similar to Article 28 of the
Brussels Convention, would be to provide that factual determinations made in
connection with a jurisdictional challenge in F-i-for instance, whether X,
established in F-i, was the agent of the defendant-would be binding, but legal
conclusions-for instance, whether a claim was related to, or arose out of, the
activities of defendant's branch in F-i-would not be binding in F-2. Of course,
the factual/legal distinction is not iron-clad; for example, if the jurisdiction of the
rendering court was asserted on the basis of a contract made in F-1 and the
defendant denies that a contract was concluded, the determination in F-1 that
a contract had been formed may well incorporate both factual and legal conclusions. But if, for instance, the defendant had claimed that the signature on a
document was not his but the court in F-1 had determined that the signature
was genuine, I do not think the F-2 court should be permitted to reexamine the
35. EEC Convention, supra note 3, arts. 19, 20, 27, 28, 34.
36. 1982 Laws c.27 (Eng.).
37. Id. § 33.
38. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Hunt
v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (contra as to foreign country
judgment). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. c and Reporters'
Note 3, also § 481 Reporters' Note 3 and cases cited therein (1987).
39. EEC Convention, supra note 3, art. 28, 1 2.
40. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws English Style, Review Essay on Dicey and Morris on
the Conflict of Laws, 11th Edition, 37 AM. J. COMp. L. 353, 361-69 (1989).
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genuineness of the signature. On the other hand, if the court in F-1 had
concluded that the document was an acceptance of the plaintiff's offer, thus
forming the contract, perhaps the court in F-2 could be permitted to consider
the defendant's claim that the document was really a counter-offer and that no
contract had come about.
3. As a further compromise, one might expand somewhat the list of steps
that a defendant could take in F-1 without being regarded as having submitted
to the jurisdiction of the F-1 court. For instance, a motion for a stay of
litigation pending arbitration, or a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens, need not be regarded as an appearance for purposes of conferring
jurisdiction on the F-1 court, at least in the context of recognition pursuant to
the convention.41 I am not entirely happy with either of these proposed
compromises, but if accepting them is the price for being labeled an idealist
rather than an idealogue, I would be prepared to go along.
C. Default Judgments
In principle, I think that there should be no difference with respect to
recognition between judgments rendered in default of appearance by the
defendant and judgments rendered after contest. Otherwise, as Dicey and
Morris point out, "the clearer the plaintiff's case, the more useless his judgment
would be" if the defendant had no assets in the state of the rendering court.42
The principle needs some qualification, however. The successful party should
be required, if challenged, to prove in F-2 that the defendant was duly served
with initiating process (whether in F-1 or elsewhere), that there was sufficient
time to prepare a defense, and that no travel restrictions or similar impediments
prevented the defendant from appearing in the first forum to mount a defense.
The fact that the opportunity remains in F-1 for the defendant to reopen a
default should not be regarded as impairing the finality of the judgment sought
to be enforced in F-2, any more than finality is impaired by a pending appeal
in F-1. One might consider a provision in a judgments convention to the effect
that a judgment rendered by default in F-1 shall not be entitled to recognition
in F-2 unless the claimant has established his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court in F-i, as contrasted with a judgment simply based (in
default of a reply) on the statement of claim by the plaintiff.43 One might

41. The example comes from the much debated case of Henry v. Geoprosco Int'l Ltd., [1976] Q.B.
726 (C.A.), and from § 33 of the U.K. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (c.27). If the F-1 court
held that the parties had not concluded an agreement to arbitrate covering the controversy, and
thereafter rendered judgment for plaintiff, when plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment in F-2,
defendant could, under this formulation, challenge the judicial jurisdiction of the F-1 court; he could
not, however, again interpose the arbitration clause, because the determination that it was not effective
or did not cover the controversy would be binding as res judicata.
42. ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLIcT OF LAWS 429 (11th ed. Collins, 1987).
43. Compare, e.g., the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1608(d), concerning default
judgments against foreign states or state instrumentalities. The British State Immunity Act has no
comparable provision. See § 12.
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consider applying such a rule also to other kinds of default judgments, for
instance to judgments entered against a party disobeying an order for discovery.4
D. Injunctions
1. In general, injunctions issued by one court have not been given much
respect by other courts, especially if the other courts are located in different
states. The reason may be that injunctions are perceived as requiring continuing
judicial supervision, and thus not easily transferable from one state to another.
Also, injunctions are often subject to modification, and even if not, they do not
fit easily into the definition of a final judgment. Nevertheless, I think the
banishment of injunctions from the law of recognition and enforcement of
judgments is too broad. It seems to me that in two areas, at least, consideration
should be given to including injunctions within a comprehensive judgments
convention. When a party is ordered by a court in one state not to dispose of
his assets wherever they may be located, as under a Mareva injunction, it seems
to me that courts of other states ought to be prepared-if not required-to
cooperate.
We recently have seen, for instance, that English courts will, in appropriate
cases, restrain parties over whom they have jurisdiction from dealing with any
of their assets worldwide. 45 The injunction is binding on the target of the
injunction, who may or may not be a judgment debtor, as well as on banks and
other custodians of assets in England when duly notified.' But in order to
avoid "exorbitant assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over third parties," the
Court of Appeal ruled in two cases that the injunction would not apply to third
parties outside of England, even when those third parties, such as major British
and foreign banks, were present both in England and in foreign countries where
they might have held assets of the defendant. 47 Thus, for instance, if the target
of the Mareva injunction had assets in Credit Suisse in Geneva or Citibank in
New York, the injunction would not restrain those banks from honoring
withdrawal orders issued by the target, even though the two banks had branches
in England which had been duly notified of the injunction.
I believe the English courts have stopped at the right place; but if the
plaintiff (that is, the person on whose application the Mareva injunction was
issued) takes the injunction to the appropriate court in New York or Geneva,
I think that court should act to enforce the injunction-that is, it should issue

44. Compare U.S. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); U.K. R.S.C., Order 24, Rule 16.
45. See, e.g., Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1990] Ch. 13, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 232 (C.A.). For
a detailed discussion of this and similar cases, see Lawrence Collins, The TerritorialReach of Mareva
Injunctions, 105 L. Q. REV. 262 (1989).
46. See generally Order 29, Rule 1/20-23 in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (1991) (Eng.).
47. See Babanaft, [1990] Ch. 13, [1989] 1 All E.R. (C.A.); Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1990] Q.B.
202, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 261 (C.A.).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

its own injunction on the basis of the F-1 injunction.'
convention would encourage this result.'
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I would hope the

2. Similarly, we have recently seen a large number of important international bankruptcies-Alan Bond, Olympia & York, Maxwell, BCCI-and others
less celebrated but not less international in scope. We have seen the. spectacle
of a court in the United Kingdom enjoining removal of assets of a U.S.
company from that country pending adjudication of claims by English creditors,
notwithstanding the fact that the company was being reorganized under Chapter
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and the fact that the bankruptcy court in New
York had issued an order restraining all legal action against the debtor company
except in the context of the bankruptcy proceeding." In the reverse situation,
considered but not followed by the English court, a U.S. court ordered release
of a vessel arrested in New York by creditors of a company involved in
bankruptcy proceedings in Sweden, so that the property could be administered
in accordance with the orders of the Swedish court.51 I do not know enough
about the different solutions to bankruptcy in different countries to have a firm
view on how cases such as these should be dealt with, but my instinct is to look
to the orders of the court where the principal proceeding takes place. For
present purposes, I would urge only that there should not be any presumption
that injunctions of foreign courts do not matter or run only in personam.52
3. I do not suggest that complicated matters such as Mareva injunctions and
transnational bankruptcy be placed on the agenda of a judgments convention
right away. But I suggest that the traditional narrow focus of judgments
conventions is misplaced-no longer appropriate in an age in which the
combination of computers and communication by satellite has made almost
instantaneous transfer of funds commonplace, and has rendered the opportunities for fraud more widespread than ever. I would hope that the drafters of a

48. In a third case in this series, Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1), [1990] Ch. 48, [1989] 2
W.L.R. 276 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal accepted an undertaking by plaintiffs that before they applied
to a foreign court to enforce the order, they would first seek leave from the English court, which would
presumably consider the law of the foreign country in question before granting or denying leave.
49. For a more detailed discussion of this scenario, in the context of a divorce action brought by
the wife in England against a husband domiciled in Spain but with assets in the United States, see
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Injunctions Across National Frontiers:A Tale of Two Cities, 3 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 3 (1993).
50. Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v. United States Lines Inc., [1989] 1 Q.B. 360.
51. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Victrix
Steamship Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987).
52. It is worth noting that in recent proceedings arising out of the collapse of the Robert Maxwell
group of companies, the English and U.S. courts have been cooperating closely. Efforts by individual
English creditors to invoke English law against U.S. rules designed to reverse preferential payments
shortly before the bankruptcy filing were rejected by the English courts. See Barclays Bank Plc. v.
Homan, [1993] BCLC 680 (C.A.). Efforts by the English administration to file an ancillary petition in
the U.S. bankruptcy court and to take discovery of persons in the United States from persons having
knowledge of U.S. assets of the English debtor were upheld. Petition of Brierly, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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new Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
could at least endorse an article that said:
(a)
nothing in this Convention precludes any contracting
party from recognizing injunctions issued by the
courts of other states; and
the contracting states commit themselves within [a stated
(b)
period] to consider the conditions under which orders of
courts of other contracting states enjoining the transfer
of funds or the bringing of claims against bankrupt
estates shall be recognized in other contracting states.
If one needed a precedent for such a provision, one could recall that the
drafters of the Brussels Convention were not quite ready to commit their states
to submitting decisions on jurisdiction and judgments to review by the European
Court of Justice; they issued a Joint Declaration, however, stating that they were
"ready . . . to examine the possibility ... and if necessary, to negotiate an
agreement to this effect. '5 3 Within three years, they had agreed on a Protocol
that indeed did confer jurisdiction on the Court of Justice, thus greatly
strengthening the Brussels Convention and its purpose of serving as a unifying
force in the European Community.
E. Scope of the Convention
Finally, what controversies should be excluded from the convention? The
Hague Conventions-Service, Evidence, and Judgments (1971)-all focus on
"civil and commercial" or "civil or commercial," as do the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions.54 The definition of "civil and commercial" is not clear, and it
took the English courts more than three years, two appeals, and finally a
decision of the House of Lords before they got it right, in the context of the
Hague Evidence Convention." It is still not clear, however, whether "civil and
commercial" should be judged by the law of the state of origin, by the law of
the requested state, by the law of both states, or in an autonomous manner, as
the Special Commission to review the Operation of the Hague Conventions
recommended.5 6
I would urge that the drafters of the proposed judgments convention
abandon the term "civil or commercial," or define the term simply by excluding
criminal matters, arbitral awards, and matters relating to status. I do not believe
there is justification for excluding final judgments relating to succession, or
bankruptcy, or, indeed, judgments of administrative tribunals rendered in

53. Joint Declaration attached to EEC Convention, supra note 3.
54. The U.N. Arbitration Convention has no such limitation, but permits states to declare that they
will apply it only to differences considered commercial under their national law. About half the
contracting states, including the United States and France, but not the United Kingdom, Germany, or
Japan, have made this declaration.
55. Re State of Norway's Applications (Nos. 1 and 2), [1990] A.C. 723, [1989] 1 All E.R. 746.
56. See Report on the work of the Special Commission of April 1989 on the operation of the Hague
Conventions, 28 I.L.M. 1558, 1563 (1989).
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circumstances assuring fairness and independent decision."

[Vol. 57: No. 3

Courts in the

United States have recognized judgments in all these areas, without serious
threat to the Republic.58
In 1973 a U.S. district court appointed a receiver to marshal what was left
of the assets of the I.O.S. group of companies that had been systematically
looted by the financier Robert Vesco, by then a fugitive. The receiver applied
to the English Chancery Court for an order restraining removal from London
banks of assets believed to be under Vesco's control, but the English court
refused the application, inter alia, on the ground that the receiver was a "public

official" seeking to enforce a "penal statute" of the United States-the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934."9 I think that case is wrongly decided; it does

nothing for the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and only helps crooks to
succeed in fleecing clients who once trusted them.

I would hope a new

judgments convention would correct this injustice.' °
Again, I would suggest proceeding by stages, that is by including a somewhat
narrower scope of coverage of the convention at the first stage, but-rather than

excluding the subjects on which agreement is not thought to be attainable at the
outset-stating

that nothing precludes

recognition

and enforcement of

judgments in situations where recognition is not required, and committing the
parties to reconsideration of the scope of the convention within a stated
period-say three to five years after the first-stage convention enters into effect.

IV
CONCLUSION

This completes my catalogue of proposals for a useful and creative
multilateral judgments convention. I believe a convention along the lines of my
suggestions would justify the energy and dedication required to achieve any
treaty in the field of law, whether negotiated under the auspices of the Hague
Conference, UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, or any other forum. I do not believe a
convention drawn too narrowly, or negotiated like a trade agreement, where
every benefit is treated like a concession to be paid for by one's negotiating
partners, would justify such an effort.

57. Thus, I think that-Article 1 of the skeleton draft referred to by Professor von Mehren's article
is much too restrictive. von Mehren, supra note 1, at 272.
58. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976) (rights of foreign trustee
in bankruptcy to records in United States); Pioneer Cafeteria Feeds, Ltd. v. Mack, 340 F.2d 719 (6th
Cir. 1965); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (alleged breach
of copyright); In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), affirmed, 96 F.2d
768 (2d Cir. 1938) (claims recognized or denied by foreign bankruptcy court); Watts v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739 (N.Y. 1970) (succession to property of decedent); Bullen v. Her Majesty's
Government, 553 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (enforcement of order of English court for
amounts owed after defendant's conviction for fraudulent evasion of value added tax).
59. Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., [1975] Ch. 273, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 406.
60. A recent decision of a Florida court came out the other way, that is, it did recognize the
authority of a receiver appointed in a foreign state and ordered by the court of that state to enforce
an injunction against dealing with the assets of a debtor company. Belle Island Inv. Co. Ltd. v.
Feingold, 453 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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I believe the supposed nightmare that a judgment will be rendered against
an American defendant in a member state of the European Community on an
exorbitant basis of jurisdiction and then enforced against assets of the defendant
in another member state of the Community 61 is not adequate justification for
entering into a judgments convention, whether bilateral or multilateral. We
have seen no such cases in the twenty years since the Brussels Convention
entered into effect, and it is unlikely that we will see such cases-or at any rate
many such cases-in the future.
What would justify the required effort would be a genuine commitment to
the principle that civil controversies that cannot be settled by negotiation or
arbitration should be submitted to appropriate courts-but only once. If this
objective can be attained, I believe the symbolism will not be lost that the
world's democracies respect each other's judicial systems and have a shared
perception of essential fairness. Beyond the many technical issues I have tried
to raise here, such a message, focused on settlement of disputes, is worth a good
deal.

61. See, e.g., Beverly May Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention-Its Threat and
Challenge to Americans, 8 INT'L LAWYER 446 (1974); see also von Mehren, supra note 1.

